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nymphes Echo est une nymphe des montagnes qui a perdu sa voix à cause de la déesse Héra, la femme de Zeus. Héra a complètement détruit sa capacité de parler sauf la capacité de répéter les mots finals d'autrui. Chez du Bellay, Echo figure la désolation de l'exilé, l'isolement de notre auteur. Le fait que personne sauf Echo ne répond à sa plainte crée une image du désespoir de l'exilé. En plus, Echo figure les sentiments de du Bellay comme poète : il est juste une voix et des mots. Comme Echo son corps a disparu et il existe uniquement dans ses lettres et ses poèmes, sans les mœurs, sans l'inspiration et sans la France.

Le final élément employé par du Bellay est l'utilisation des références naturelles. Partout dans le poème, du Bellay utilise les images naturelles pour définir l'espace où son supplice se passe. Il dit, « Je remplis de ton [France] nom les antres et les bois », et « Je sens venir l'hiver », ces deux vers construisent le domaine du supplice—un environnement dont il serait protégé, s'il était en France. Malheureusement, il n'est pas en France et le mal du pays le dévore. Ce domaine-ci est plein de menaces comme « les loups » et d'un environnement désagréable comme « le vent, [et] la froidure ». Bien que cet

environnement soit construit par la Nature, sans la protection de la France et ses mœurs, du Bellay est dans un endroit sinistre et dangereux, complètement isolé.

C'est évident que du Bellay nous donne l'exemple par excellence de la poésie de la Renaissance et la récupération des thèmes gréco-latins. Bien que cela soit vrai, il nous donne aussi un tableau de ses sentiments et son mal du pays. Cependant, est-ce qu'il a exactement appliqué les idées et les théories de la Renaissance ? Tandis que la Renaissance repose sur la récupération de la littérature et les mœurs d'Antiquité, elle repose aussi sur les capacités humaines et l'ouverture mentale d'humanité. Si du Bellay avait appliqué ces idées à sa propre vie, ne pourrait-il vivre n'importe où ? Par conséquent, on doit penser des muses et des locations pour l'artiste et aussi que la taille métaphysique de la Terre ou pour du Bellay, la France. Néanmoins, Joachim du Bellay donne un exemple magnifique de la poésie de la Renaissance et de ses sentiments sur son exil en Italie et la perte de sa mère artistique, la France.

## Solidarity: Born of Polish Tradition

Matthew Greeson

### Europe in Crisis since 1815

*As late as the mid-1980s, almost no international relations theorists or historians would have predicted the fall of the Iron Curtain. In 1989, however, free elections in Poland triggered a chain reaction of pro-independence and democracy movements across the Soviet sphere of influence. The question is what caused the native-born reform in Poland: was it purely inevitable and based on economic or political factors, or was it something deeper?*

*This paper argues that it was a strong nationalism and sense of tradition in Poland that fed the creation and success of Solidarity trade union. As Solidarity grew from a labor lobby to a social movement, it drew on a sense of Polish nationalism and pride that had its roots in the nation's tradition of independence and Catholic heritage. Polish history of revolt against occupying powers played a secondary but equally important role. In the end, it was Poland, a strongly heterogeneous and unified nation, which triggered the fall of communism across Eastern Europe.*

In September of 1939, an independent, republican Poland was invaded from two fronts by two totalitarian powers. For the next fifty years, Poland would suffer under the yoke of relentless attempts to bring it into submission, both from the inside and out. Despite these efforts, the Polish people maintained a strong sense of cultural identity and civic duty. It was these idealistic notions, nationalistic desire for autonomy, and a history of revolt against occupying powers which can be credited for the success of the Solidarity movement and the ensuing outcry for reform.

Poland's long history begins in the tenth century, with the emergence of the Piast dynasty. Poland's power grew, and it became a dominant force in Central and Eastern Europe,

culminating with the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Union in 1385 and, even more importantly, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569. This newly created state was a driving force in regional dynamics until the mid-seventeenth century, when its power began to wane. Indeed, at the end of the eighteenth century, Russia invaded a weakened Poland. Their victory over Poland led to the Third Partition of Poland, after which Poland ceased to exist as an independent state.

It is during the era of the partitions that Polish nationalism can first be seen as a strong counter-force to foreign rulers, as it would be seen again with Solidarity. As Timothy Garton Ash writes, "In 1794, and 1830-1, and 1863-4, and 1905, [Poles] expressed their longing for freedom through heroic insurrections,

which were crushed with habitual brutality by Tsarist Russia.”<sup>1</sup> In these repeated series of rebellions against foreign powers, which Poles viewed as occupying forces in their motherland, Poles showed their desire for independence. They rebelled against foreign influence and fought to maintain Polish culture and identity. This is a trend which would continue after 1939.

After the First World War, the Polish people’s nationalism garnered success. Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points included the reestablishment of the Polish Republic. This was a success for the Polish intelligentsia, and represented the fulfillment of a one hundred year old dream. The first elections occurred in 1919, and the republic lasted until the Nazi invasion of 1939. Although the nation suffered economic crises and numerous difficulties, the democratic system held stable and traditional culture was allowed to flourish.

Though Poles did not have a formal governmental structure through which to preserve Polish identity during the partitions and later periods of occupation, various forces worked to retain traditions and sustain in the populace a unique culture. These forces are essentially the same forces which preserved the Polish culture during the Cold War, and promoted Solidarity. Garton Ash writes that the “Church, the insurrectionary tradition, the cultural work of the intelligentsia and romantic Messianism forged what can best be described as the Polish national

conscience.”<sup>2</sup> The Catholic Church worked to preserve Catholicism in Poland against the influence of Russian Orthodoxy. For centuries, Catholicism has been a cornerstone of Polish culture. It serves as not only a religious and moral authority, but also a social and political force. This authority would continue into the Cold War. Similarly, the intelligentsia at home and abroad was a power that ensured continuity of culture in both the partition era and the years of Communism. Finally, Garton Ash makes a crucial point in his theory of “messianism.” Poles developed in their thinking a metaphor of Poland as Christ: beaten, humiliated, and crucified, but sure to rise again.

After the Nazi and Soviet occupations, the intelligentsia that survived fled the country, and the Home Army (KA) served as the last remaining resistance to Nazi totalitarianism. The traditional army was eliminated in weeks; the KA went underground. On the first of August, 1944, they launched their revolt in the form of the Warsaw Uprising. Rothschild and Wingfield refer to the Polish resistance as “prodigious” and to the Warsaw Uprising as “heroic but abortive.”<sup>3</sup> While these insurrections were not uncommon in occupied Europe, the Polish variety was marked by a special determination and frequency. Solidarity has often been viewed by outside observers with a reverence reserved for the most peculiar and successful of political phenomenon. The common thread linking the resistance in the Second World War and Solidarity is the level of

<sup>2</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1983), 3

<sup>3</sup> Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 26

determination and patriotism of those involved.

The Poles’ determination to remain independent and autonomous can also be contrasted with the resistance of other independent nations at the outset of World War II. Czechoslovakia, for example, was also an independent sovereign state before the war, but the resistance faced there by the Germans was minimal to that which they encountered in Poland, despite the Czechoslovaks’ notable military superiority over the Poles. Rothschild and Wingfield write, “Whereas the Poles fought the Germans in 1939 despite catastrophically unfavorable odds, the Czechoslovak regime capitulated in 1938, although its odds were not as poor.”<sup>4</sup> This comparison speaks to the Polish people’s robust love of independence. Unfortunately for them, in the mid- and late-1940s, Polish nationalism and independence were severely damaged by the Soviet-sponsored installation of a communist government. Polish culture and resistance went underground. Not even the Catholic Church, a stalwart of Polish identity, was free from the influence of the new regime. Catholic charities and hospitals were nationalized, and the church and state struck a truce which quite obviously favored the state: the church publicly repudiated the surviving underground resistance...and endorsed the regime’s lively peace propaganda, while the state reciprocally authorized that religion continue to be taught in its schools and chaplains

<sup>4</sup> Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 31

continue to function in the armed forces, jails, hospitals, and so on.<sup>5</sup>

By simply allowing the continuation of religious activities already occurring, and curtailing others, the communists won a victory. Fortunately for the church, most ordinary Poles (including many Party members) remained loyal to the church and allowed the church to trump the state and “retain a strong autonomous role in public life.”<sup>6</sup> The church continued to be a custodian of the Polish cultural tradition.

The events and dissidence of 1956 also showed strong evidence of Polish nationalism at work. Many nations were encouraged by Stalin’s 1953 death, and three years later, seized the opportunity to make their voices heard, beginning with Poland. *Return to Diversity* describes the direction of the 1956 upheaval as “toward a combination of humane Marxism with nationalistic idealism.”<sup>7</sup> Riots broke out in protest of living conditions, and the army was used to forcibly put them down. While 1956 was an isolated incident that would have less lasting influence than Solidarity, it is important evidence of Pole’s willingness to resist.

In 1978, a remarkable and incredibly lucky event to aid the cause of Polish nationalism occurred: the ascendance of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla of Krakow to the papacy. To many Poles, this event was viewed as a miracle: God had come through on the side of Poland and had given them a freedom fighter in a

<sup>5</sup> Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 86

<sup>6</sup> Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 87

<sup>7</sup> Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 151

<sup>1</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1983), 3

position of power. The communists clearly underestimated this new pope, John Paul II. In June 1979, they allowed him to return to Poland for a homecoming tour; he was received as a liberator and hero. Millions turned out across the country to see him speak, and they were not disappointed. His very presence may have been enough to start a movement, but his words made it even more likely. In Victory Square in Warsaw, near the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, he spoke from a gigantic altar to a teeming crowd, as documented by George Weigel:

The tomb of the Unknown Soldier bore silent testimony to a truth for which countless Poles had died, that "there can be no just Europe without the independence of Poland marked on its map!" Polish soldiers had fallen on numerous battlefields, "for our freedom and yours."<sup>8</sup>

His words that day not only worried the Communists, but served as a spark for the nationalist movement. The people in the audience that day were struck with nationalistic and religious fervor. They chanted religious slogans that directly contradicted the secularist and atheistic foundations of the state. The *New York Times* called the crowd "the largest in the postwar history of Poland."<sup>9</sup> This huge, passionately teeming gathering served as a catalyst for the growing nationalistic fervor which provided Solidarity with its astonishing growth in the early 1980s.

<sup>8</sup> George Weigel, *Witness to Hope* (New York: Cliff Street Books, 1999), 294

<sup>9</sup> David A. Andelman, "Pope Gets Big Welcome in Poland, Offers Challenge to the Authorities," *New York Times*, June 3, 1979, page 1.

It was events such the Pope's visit that helped transform a strike by a trade union into a national movement. Solidarity was founded first as a union of shipyard workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, Poland in September, 1980. Led by men such as Lech Walesa, it issued a document named "The Twenty-One Demands," which outlined the economic and social demands of the workers. These demands contained little to hint at Polish nationalism, but they were but the precursor to a movement. Indeed, the Gdansk Accords signed on August 31, 1980 provided for relief of both the economic and political grievances of the movement. Joseph Rothschild and Nancy Wingfield wrote about the concessions made by the government in their book *Return to Diversity*:

The agreement also provided that the state radio system broadcast Catholic Sunday Mass; that political prisoners be released; that the dismissals and persecutions of the strikers of 1970 and 1976 be reexamined...and that the communications media be opened to a variety of views and opinions.<sup>10</sup>

This agreement highlighted several factors, most especially the increasingly political tone that this trade union had acquired. It also showed the government's original uncertainty on whether or not to acquiesce to the union's demands, and their ultimate concessions (which were later reversed, and then eventually exceeded).

By 1981, it became clear that Solidarity was no longer simply a trade union, but had been transformed into a widespread and popular political

<sup>10</sup> Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 199 - 200

movement. Garton Ash references a poll taken in September of that year:

A thousand Solidarity members were asked what should now be a top priority for the movement. 'National Sovereignty' came top of the list, being mentioned by 44 per cent of respondents, while, by comparison, 43 per cent mentioned economic reform, 32 per cent curbing censorship, and just 21 per cent self-government...people fell back into the traditional theatre of national defiance.<sup>11</sup>

This poll makes clear the direction in which the movement had turned: towards national independence and away from pure economic reform. Poles had gained confidence in their beliefs, and recognized the opportunity to fight for Polish identity and autonomy. Unfortunately, it was not long before the government cracked down: in December, 1981, President Jaruzelski declared that martial law was in effect. Thousands of leading Solidarity members were arrested and the movement was banned.

Martial law makes clear the amount of resistance the leaders of Solidarity faced from government officials, and the government's fear of Soviet reprisals. Indeed, there existed a great hostility towards Solidarity among the Party's hardliners. One of the leaders of Solidarity, Father Jerzy Popieluszko, was murdered by members of the state police force on October 19, 1984, after martial law. Popieluszko, called a "vocal opposition priest," was kidnapped and his body

<sup>11</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983), 252

dumped in a reservoir.<sup>12</sup> He had been known for his vociferous sermons opposing communism, and was more than likely deemed an unacceptable threat by the communists. This assassination was the height of the threat posed to Solidarity and its figureheads by the government. The movement also faced "the occasional brutality of the provincial militia and security services" which caused a fear of reprisals and a distrust of the government's promises.<sup>13</sup> The central government also maintained that martial law was a necessity to prevent Soviet invasion, which was a constant fear looming over President Jaruzelski. The *New York Times* documented this intimidation of the Polish government on June 5, 1981, before the onset of martial law: "Earlier this week, John D. Scanlan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, told a foreign policy conference at the State Department that 'political intimidation' of the Solidarity labor movement and the Polish Communist Party leadership had been stepped up by the Soviet, East German and Czechoslovak press and broadcasting services."<sup>14</sup> For the party leaders, Soviet invasion was beginning to seem a very real and very frightening possibility, which translated into heightened Solidarity crack-downs. Without a doubt, Solidarity leaders were struggling against a government which controlled their fate. Perversely, that same government's fate was controlled by a much larger power, just to the east.

<sup>12</sup> Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 203

<sup>13</sup> Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 202

<sup>14</sup> Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Hears of New Maneuvers Near Poland but is Wary of 'Crying Wolf,'" *New York Times*, June 5, 1981, sec. A.

At the same time, the period of martial law makes clear how the Polish and Soviet governments' misunderstanding the nationalist nature of Solidarity allowed it to grow out of their control. In a speech made during a session of the Soviet Politburo, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev stated, "All of us clearly understand that the decisive precondition for the full stabilization of things in Poland is a revival of the economy."<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately for Brezhnev, the situation had moved far beyond economics. At this point, Poles had come to see Solidarity as their vehicle for opposing the regime. As Barbara Pendzich, a Central European history scholar and worker at the Brussels headquarters of NSZZ Solidarnosc Abroad during the 1980s, writes, "There was a very vital, despite all the communists' efforts, tradition of independence and civic resistance to dictatorship and tyranny."<sup>16</sup> The movement had gained steam and, despite the difficulties it faced, continued. Pendzich describes the situation in which Solidarity operated during martial law:

Paper was rationed, telephones were few and far in between, unreliable and bugged. All the press was censored as were all publishing houses. Mail was under secret service surveillance to an even greater extent in the early 1980's than in the Stalinist era. This was a essentially a private endeavor – individuals working on their own time, basically utilizing their own human resources and very modest

incomes against a machine that controlled the medias, the press, the army, all major resources, the national economy, and also had a huge "ally" behind it.<sup>17</sup>

The period of martial law was the true test for Solidarity. The government was doing everything it could to clamp down on Solidarity, arresting thousands, monitoring organizers, and declaring it illegal. Despite this, the traditional Polish resistance to totalitarian authority continued, and Solidarity survived martial law.

After President Jaruzelski revoked martial law, Solidarity's prospects began to brighten. Admittedly, Solidarity emerged from the period battered and bruised, but it was, in fact, stronger than ever. Solidarity had survived well underground, and was prepared to seize every opportunity it was granted to further its cause. As a matter of fact, martial law had built for Solidarity a network of loyal young people who "ran around distributing illegal underground anti-communist literature...other democratic and otherwise banned tracts, organizing rallies and radio broadcasts" and generally aiding the cause for which they were so passionate.<sup>18</sup> Solidarity had established a solid base on which to build.

The first major post-martial law break for Solidarity came in 1985, which was the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev is best known as a reformer, and he put this into clear action in his policy on Poland: the regime and the society remained locked in their stalemate until the intervention of the "Gorbachev factor" in

1987/88. At the height of his authority and acumen, the Soviet leader decided to support Jaruzelski against his critics and would-be challengers within the Polish Communist regime, but to urge him towards serious political reforms.<sup>19</sup>

This decision marked the point of no return for the regime in Poland. After Gorbachev began to loosen the screws of totalitarianism, Poland's course of reform began to become apparent.

The first free elections in Poland since the Second Republic took place in June 1989. Despite receiving its guaranteed sixty-five percent majority coalition, the Communist Party lost control of its associated parties, and Solidarity selected Tadeusz Mazowiecki as prime minister. Though Solidarity has since lost control over the legislature, the impact of this nationalist movement which achieved Polish autonomy and democracy, is felt daily in the revived economy and political freedoms of the Republic of Poland.

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<sup>15</sup>"CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt)" <[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic\\_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection&item=1980-81%20Polish%20Crisis](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection&item=1980-81%20Polish%20Crisis)>

<sup>16</sup> Barbara Pendzich, email to author, April 30, 2006.

<sup>17</sup> Barbara Pendzich, email to author, April 30, 2006.

<sup>18</sup> Barbara Pendzich, email to author, April 30, 2006.

<sup>19</sup> Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 229